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Digital medicine, cybersecurity and ethics: An uneasy relationship 
The paper of Klugman et al. has the merit of pointing out in great detail, which ethical questions will 
be raised if in the near future sophisticated mobile (and partly implantable) information technology 
devices are used in healthcare to monitor patients and to provide targeted therapeutic interventions 
such as drug applications or neuronal stimulation. Such “self-acting medical devices” (in the following 
we use the acronym SAMD; “smart pills” are one type of a SAMD application) will require 
sophisticated information technology including sensor, computation, communication and actor (e.g. 
drug release systems) capabilities in order to function properly. In our contribution, we complement 
the “ethical landscape” of Klugman et al. by adding an important, but often neglected dimension: the 
cybersecurity of such systems and the ethical issues raised by enforcing it. Our considerations are 
based on the findings of the ongoing, EU-funded project CANVAS (https://canvas-project.eu/canvas/) 
on the ethics of cybersecurity. 
Following the International Telecommunication Union definition, cybersecurity involves the 
“collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management 
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect 
the cyber environment, organization and user’s assets”. Cybersecurity thus involves a broad 
spectrum of desiderata that sophisticated information and communication technology (ICT) systems 
such as SAMDs should comply to. Those include:  
 Quality and efficiency of services: One of the main purposes of ICT systems in healthcare is 
the administration of information about patients and treatments in order to increase 
efficiency and to reduce costs. Quality, as distinct from efficiency, refers to improvements in 
healthcare of qualitative, not only quantitative nature. 
 Privacy of information and confidentiality of communication: Privacy and confidentiality are 
important desiderata of services in the medical domain. The notion of privacy concerns 
information that is not meant to be shared with anyone, while confidentiality implies the 
protection of communication channels between a SAMD and trusted parties. This may 
require the use of technological means such as encryption that are energy costly. 
 Usability: ICT is designed to afford usability, i.e., “the degree of effectiveness, efficiency, and 
satisfaction with which users of a system can realize their intended task” (Roman et al., 2017, 
p. 70). Depending on the function of the ICT system in question, users can be patients, health 
workers and professionals, administrators, or a combination of these. 
 Safety: Safety can be defined as the reduction of health-threatening risks and risks to 
persons’ health. Safety can be distinguished from quality, in that, for example, a SAMD can 
both enable therapies of higher quality and simultaneously expose patients to new risks, e.g. 
in the event of a cyberattack. 
Those desiderata obviously also relate to SAMDs; and several of the considerations of Klugman et al. 
actually concern ethical implications of those desiderata (e.g., regarding the confidentiality of data or 
trusting the device). However, enforcing cybersecurity of SAMDs through means such as encrypted 
communication, security protocols on the level of clinicians that supervise a SAMD or data 
management training do involve additional ethical issues. As the principles of biomedical ethics 
originally introduced by Beauchamp and Childress (1979) are a well-known ethical framework within 
bioethics, we use it here to outline briefly some value conflicts that may emerge when SAMDs should 
comply with the desiderata mentioned above:  
Beneficence and autonomy vs. non-maleficence and justice: Suppose that cybersecurity in 
healthcare should optimize quality and efficiency of healthcare services as well as privacy of 
information and confidentiality of communication. Such a design could be responsive to the 
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individual preferences of patients, while protecting their privacy (which relates to the principle of 
autonomy mentioned by Beauchamp and Childress) and allocating resources efficiently (which 
relates to the principle of beneficence). But a SAMD capable of achieving this will tend to be quite 
complex and, as such, compromises usability. For example, it may prevent certain patient groups 
from using such a device, which would be a conflict with the justice principle. SAMDs with extended 
networking capabilities and privacy protections may also reduce usability in critical situations (for 
instance with regard to complex authorization procedures) and thus affects safety, which is in 
tension with the principle of non-maleficence. Finally, such design choices may conflict with justice in 
relation to privacy and safety: A platform for accessing SAMD data with complex authentication (e.g. 
long and difficult passwords) may encourage workarounds (e.g. writing passwords in unsafe places) 
in particular among less tech-savvy users. 
Beneficence and autonomy vs. non-maleficence and autonomy: Consider highly networked, data-
intensive SAMDs designed to benefit people with better and more cost-effective healthcare services 
while respecting their autonomy. If the system involves complex, granular, stratified authorization 
systems requiring complex passwords, it again may invite workarounds, which undermines 
cybersecurity. This generates exposure to passive and active attackers, who may interfere with a 
device or gain access to confidential information, which is in conflict with both the principles of non-
maleficence and (privacy-related) autonomy. 
Beneficence, justice and non-maleficence vs. autonomy and non-maleficence: Suppose, for 
instance, SAMDs making extensive use of patients’ surveillance with good protection of data integrity 
and accessibility but poor protection fo  confidentiality and privacy. Again, a design of this kind may 
comply with some aspects of the principle of beneficence and some aspects of non-maleficence, but 
would sacrifice autonomy due to patient surveillance and privacy violations as well as other aspects 
of non-maleficence. Incidentally, such design may be compatible with justice only because it ‘levels 
down’ privacy and autonomy for all patients. 
Non-maleficence and autonomy vs. beneficence and autonomy: Consider SAMDs optimized to 
promote privacy and safety. An extreme form of this would be SAMDs minimizing data collection, 
data sharing, communication and networking; i.e. the system would have advanced autonomous 
capabilities in order to be able to deal with unexpected situations. Such system may actually be able 
to avoid privacy breaches and device malfunctions. It would thus be responsive to the principle of 
non-maleficence and autonomy, as far as it protects privacy, which is crucial for autonomy. However, 
such SAMDs could not be used for providing data-intensive services, which may involve a sacrifice in 
quality and/or cost-effectiveness contrary to the principle of beneficence. Furthermore, the energy 
needs of such advanced autonomous technology are likely to be high, which again would impede 
some aspects of usability with implications on autonomy and beneficence. 
Justice vs. autonomy and non-maleficence: A design choice may promote quality and efficiency 
while equalizing safety and privacy for different demographics. Think about a SAMD with a relatively 
simple authentication system and few or merely one-size-fit-all privacy options. Complex 
authentication systems would then be avoided. It may be more suitable for patients from certain 
demographics (e.g. elderly or people lacking digital literacy) who may actually gain autonomy, 
paradoxically, thanks to a system that offers few personalization options and is therefore simple to 
use. Less sophisticated ICT users would also be less tempted to find workarounds to security, so 
these SAMDs may achieve a more even level of security. Their design might reach a more equal 
distribution of benefits as it would be easier for otherwise disadvantaged users to take advantage of 
it. Such SAMDs would be compatible with justice but would be incompatible with services that are 
very complex except in ways that imply extensive patient surveillance across all spheres of human 
life. It would also conflict with the principle of non-maleficence in that it would feature weak 
authentication, which could put the privacy of the most vulnerable individuals at risk. 
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This brief analysis outlines that trade-offs involved in design choices concerning cybersecurity for 
SAMDs map onto conflicts among the four principles of bioethics. These trade-offs and the 
corresponding conflicts seem unavoidable. As Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism does not 
provide priority rules for balancing the four principles when they conflict, balancing them is left to 
the wisdom of ethical decision makers (e.g. physicians, ICT developers and administrators). As a 
prerequisite, this requires awareness of such conflicts and – in a next step and using the words of 
Klugman et al. – “planning for, and iteratively addressing the array of ethical issues”. For doing this, it 
would be wise to expand the spectrum of ethical investigation on the cybersecurity implications of 
SAMDs. 
References 
Beauchamp, Tom L., and  James F. Childress. 1979. Principles of biomedical ethics. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
ITU. 2008. International Telecommunications Union, ITU-TX.1205: Series X: Data networks, open 
system communications and security: Telecommunication security: Overview of cybersecurity. 
https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1205-200804-I. 
Roman, Lisette C., Jessica S. Ancker, Stephen B. Johnson, and Yalini Senathirajah. 2017. “Navigation in 
the electronic health record: A review of the safety and usability literature”. Journal of Biomedical 
Informatics 67 (3): 69–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbi.2017.01.005. 
Page 3 of 3
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/uajb
American Journal of Bioethics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
